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preted the section as simply denoting
that the Treaty related back to crimes
which occurred before the Treaty was
ratified. Id.
Next the Court determined that section 9 of the Treaty "provide[d] a
mechanism [for extradition] which
would not otherwise exist," but did not
represent the only mechanism for gaining custody. Id. at 2193-94. Article 9
provided that afterreceiving an official
request for extradition, a nation could
either extradite the requested person or
prosecute the person on its own. Id. at
2194. Thus, Alvarez contended, Article 9 specified the only manner in
which a nation could gain custody over
an individual on foreign soil. He asserted that the restrictions and procedures established by the Treaty became superfluous if either nation was
allowed to circumvent the Treaty
through forcible abductions. Id. The
Court bolstered its position, however,
by noting that Mexico had actual notice of the Ker doctrine and the
doctrine's applicability to the Treaty.
Id.
Finally, the Court rQled that the
general international law's prohibition
of forcible abductions did not have
effect under the Treaty, nor required
that a similar prohibition be implied
into the Treaty. Id. at 2194. Alvarez
recognized that under the Treaty, the
rights of the abducted individual were
a derivative of the rights of the allegedly aggrieved nation. As such, once
that nation protested the abduction, the
nation's rights under the Treaty were
traDsformed into the individual's rights
under the international law. Alvarez
concluded that because both the abduction violated his individual rights
and Mexico filed a protest, the Treaty
must be enforced on his behalf to bar
the in personam jurisdiction of the
United States District Court. Id. at
2195. The Court rejected this theory
fortwo reasons. First, the Court opined
that such rigid enforcement produced
unjust results if one nation acted offensively toward the other. Id. Second,
the Court pronounced that only the law
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between nations specifically applied to
extradition treaties should be considered, not the full body of the general
international law. Id.
A lengthy dissent written by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor condemned
the majority ruling fortuming the terms
of the Treaty into little more than verbiage. The dissent accused the Court's
entire opinion ofbeing critically flawed
because it failed to differentiate between private conduct and governmental action. Id at 2203. The dissent
concluded that the abduction was expressly sanctioned by the Executive
Branch and was therefore constituted a
flagrant breach of the Treaty. Id.
Thus, the majority ofthe Supreme
Court, in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, held
that the U.S. government may solicit
the forcible abduction of a foreign national in order to obtain jurisdiction
over that person. In so doing, the Court
established the rule that the existence
of an extradition treaty between the
nations is consequential only if the
treaty is invoked. This decision may
seriously affect the United States's future efforts to initiate joint actions with
foreign nations who are already leery
of the United States. After this case
was decided, Mexico promptly ceased
all joint actions with the DEA and also
began the process ofre-evaluating the
Treaty. However, it is likely that the
Court sought to make the "right" decision under the circumstances in order
to allow the courts to decide the innocence, or guilt, of an alleged villain.
By adopting the approach that an extradition treaty must be invoked to
have affect, the Court eliminated treatybased jurisdictional challenges to international abductions and granted the
United States a free hand to grab suspected criminals and bring them to
trial.
- Brett R. Wilson

MVA v. Chamberlain: DRUNKDRIV-

ERS NEED NOT BE INFORMED
OF ALLDISPARITIESBETWEEN
SANCTIONS FOR FAILING A
CHEMICAL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION TEST AND REFUSING TO TAKE SUCH A TEST
ALTOGETHER.
In a unanimous decision interpreting sections of Maryland's transportation statutes relating to drunk driving,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
MVA v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 296,
604 A.2d 919 (1992), ruled that a police officer is not required to inform an
intoxicated motorist of all potential
differences in penalties between refusing and failing a chemical alcohol concentration test. In so holding, the Court
declined to recognize additional procedural protection for motorists who
decline to submit to a blood alcohol
test.
The defendant Chamberlain was
stopped by a police officer for speeding and suspicion of driving while
intoxicated Afterthe officerpenormed
some field sobriety tests on Chamberlain, the officer placed Chamberlain
under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Then, quoting section 16-205.1
of the Transportation Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code, the officer
informed Chamberlain of his rights
pertaining to taking a chemical test to
determine his blood alcohol level.
The officer told Chamberlain of his
right to refuse to submit to the test but
warned that a refusal would result in an
administrative suspension ofhis Maryland driver's license. Additionally, the
officer stipulated that "[s]uspension by
the Motor Vehicle Administration shall
be 120 days for a first offense and one
year for a second or subsequent offense." Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 310,
604 A.2d at 921 (quoting Md. Trans.
Code Ann. § 16-205. 1(b) (1987».
Chamberlain was also told of the
consequences offailing to take the test.
The officer, quoting from an advice of
rights form, warned Chamberlain that
if he submitted to the test, and the
results indicated an alcohol concentra-
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tion of .10 or more, an administrative
suspension ofhis driver's license would
result. The officer further informed
Chamberlain that "[t)he suspension by
the Motor Vehicle Administmtionshall
be 45 days for a first offense and 90
days for a second or subsequent offense." Id. However, the officer did
not tell Chamberlain that if he failed
the test, the suspension could be modified or a restrictive license could be
issued for work and alcohol education
purposes.
Because Chamberlain refused to
take the test, his license was temporarily confiscated and he was issued a
temporary 45 day restrictive license.
At his administrative hearing Chamberlain contended that the police officer had not properly advised him ofthe
consequences of refusing to take the
test or of failing it. Chamberlain, 326
Md at 311, 604 A.2d at 920. The
Administrative Law Judge ("ALI")
refused to consider Chamberlain's argument. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, however, found the
officer's advice to be inadequate and
reversed the decision ofthe AU. Id. at
312, 604 A.2d at 920. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider the case because it
found the matter to be of public importance. Id.
The heart of Chamberlain's argument on appeal concerned how much
advice the police were required to give
a detained driver who refused to submit to a chemical alcohol concentration test. Id. at 312, 604 A.2d at 922.
Specifically, Chamberlain focused on
the language of section 16-205.1 (b)(2)
of the Transportation Article which
provides that "[t)he police officer shaH
. . . advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for the refusal to take the test."
Chamberlain, 326 Md at 313, 604
A.2d at 922 (emphasis added). Tuming to earlier laws pertaining to chemical alcohol tests, Chamberlain pointed
out that the word ''penalties'' in the
prior statute had been replaced by the
word "sanctions" in the current statute.

Id. Contending that the word "sanctions" was broader than the word ''penalties," Chamberlain asserted that the
Legislature intended for more advice
to be given under the current statute
than under the former. Id. Thus,
Chamberlain argued that in addition to
the length of the suspension, the detained driver must at least have been
told of another possible consequence
resulting from failing the test, but not
from refusing it.
In opposition, the MVA contended
that the police need only inform the
detained driver of the difference in the
lengths ofthe suspensions forrefusing
to take the test and for failing the test.
Id. at 314, 604 A.2d at 922. Further,
the MVA argued that possible eligibility for a restrictive license or modification ofthe suspension was not a "sanction" as contemplated by the Legislature and thus was not a fact of which
the driver needed to be informed Id.
In ruling against Chamberlain, the
court of appeals first noted that in
determining legislative intent, statutory construction mandated that the
language of a statute be given its ordinary and common meaning. Id. at314,
604 A.2d at 923 (citing Dickerson v.
State, 324 Md 163, 170-72,516 A.2d
648, 651-52 (1991». The court explained that section 16-205.9(b)(1)
explicitly detailed the consequences
for refusal and failure to take a chemical test and further pointed out that
nowhere in subsection (b)(I) was the
word "sanction" ever mentioned. Because of this omission, the court reasoned that subsequent paragraphs in
the subsection which used the words
"administrative sanctions" were merely
using a "short hand equivalent" relating implicitly back to (b)(I); thus, the
word "sanction" had no independent
meaning from that given to it in (b)( 1).
Chamberlain, 326 Md at 316, 604
A.2d at 924. The court determined that
such an interpretation of the statutory
language was "reasonable and consistent with the purposes of the statute."
Id. at 317, 604 A.2d at 924.
The court also rejected Chamberlain's

assertion that advice concerning the
possibility for suspension might be
incentive to take the test and was therefore a "sanction"underthe broad meaning ofthe word Id. The court stated
that such a possibility was not a sanction because, although the word "sanction" might in some contexts encompass rewards as weIl as penalties, not
every conceivable incentive for action
was a reward Id. at 318, 604 A..2d
at 924. Moreover, the court asserted
that it was "inconceivable" that the
Legislature intended sanctions to include advice about one's potential to
obtain a modified license if one failed
that chemical alcohol concentration
test. Id. Whether a person would
consider this possibility as an incentive to take the test was questioned by
the court.
Furthermore, it was noted that informing a person that he or she might
get a modified license by taking the
test was misleading. Id. at 319, 604
A.2d at 925. Although a license could
potentiaIly be modified, an individual
would have to meet statutory prerequisites in order to become eligible. Because the arresting officer would have
no way of knowing whether or not a
detained driver would meet the prerequisites, the court asserted that giving
notification might falsely persuade the
motorist to take the test.
Finally, the court reviewed decisions of other jurisdictions involving
interpretation of drunk driving statutes. The court noted that the consensus of other states was that, although a
driver was to be given the option of
whether to take a chemical test, the
driver need not be told of every possible consequence of each option. Id.
at 320, .604 A.2d at 926. Aligning itself
with the decisions of other states, the
court ofappeals held that Chamberlain
had been sufficiently advised of the
consequences ofboth refusing and failing a chemical test for alcohol. Id. at
323, 604 A.2d at 926. Thus,
Chamberlain's license suspension was
affirmed.
MVA. v. Chamberlain affirms the
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Legislature's intent that a driver need
not be told ofall possible consequences
between refusing and failing a chemical test for alcohol. In addition, by
fmding that the word "sanctions" does
not encompass mere possibilities, the
court has refused to recognize additional procedural safeguards for persons who decline to take chemical alcohol concentration tests. By deciding
that an officer is not required to advise
a driver of potential eligibility for
modification of suspension or restrictive license ifa driver takes the chemical alcohol test, the court has implied
that a person who refuses to take the
test must be prepared to face the consequences.
- Ellen Marth
R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul: CITY OR-

DINANCE BANNING CROSS
BURNINGS AND OTHER SYMBOLS OF HATE SPEECH VIOLA TES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
In R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a city ordinance banning cross burnings and other
hate crimes violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
because it discriminated on the basis of
speech content and was not reasonably
necessary to achieve the compelling
interest of protecting groups that have
historically been the victims of discrimination. While the Court unanimously agreed that the law was facially invalid, it was divided over the
proper analysis of the ordinance under
the First Amendment. The Court's
decision resulted in a clash of interpretations, with a four member concurrence charging the majority with abandoning long established First Amendment principles.
In 1990, the petitioner, a white teenager, burned a cross on the front lawn
of a black family that had recently
moved into the city ofSt. Paul, Minnesota. The petitioner was charged with
violating a local hate crime law that
prohibited the display of a symbol
18

which aroused anger, alann, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. The
ordinance specifically cited cross burning and swastika displays as acts punishable under its mandate.
The trial court dismissed the charges
on the grounds that the law was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota rejected the overbreadth
claim and upheld the ordinance because the statute limited its reach to
"fighting words" and was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The petitioner challenged the constitutionality ofthe statute, arguing that it infringed upon his
First Amendment right to free speech.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether the ordinance discriminated impermissibly on the basis
of content, and, if so, whether such
discrimination was reasonably necessary to achieve the state's compelling
interest in protecting those who have
historically been the targets of discrimination.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
began his analysis by acknowledging
that limited categories ofspeech - such
as obscenity, defamation and fighting
words - had been proscribed on the
basis of content because their low social value was outweighed by a higher
social interest. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at
2543 (citing Chap/inskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942». In
this case, however, the majority rejected the view that "fighting words,"
defined as insults which are likely to
provoke the listener to react violently,
were entirely without constitutional
protection. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
The Court determined that the government could proscribe "fighting words"
in general because of the activity they
provoked, but it could not proscribe
specific sub-categories of fighting
words because of the ideas they expressed orthe classes they targeted. Id.
at 2544. Thus, the majority found that
the St. Paul ordinance was content
discriminatory because it imposed spe-

cial prohibitions on those who expressed views on the disfavored subjects of race, color, creed, religion or
gender, while at the same time permitting equally abusive messages which
did not address those topics. R.A. V.,
112 S. Ct. at 2547. In addition, the
Court reasoned that because there were
content-neutral alternatives available,
such as prosecuting the conduct under
an arson statute, the city's compelling
interest in protecting minority groups
from victimization did not justify the
law's discrimination. Id at 2550.
The Court next outlined the two
exceptions to content-based discrimination. The flI'st exception occurs when
the purpose of the distinction is content-neutral. Id. at 2545. A$ an illustration, the Court noted that a state
could prohibit obscenity generally, but
it could not prohibit obscenity that
only included offensive political messages.ld at2546. Similarly, the Court
noted that burning a flag in violation of
an arson statute was punishable, but it
had been held content-discriminatory
to punish flag burning in violation ofa
law against dishonoring the flag. Id. at
2544 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989». "Fighting
words," according to the Court, were
unprotected because ''their content
embodie[d] an intolerable mode of
expression." R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at
2549. Justice Scalia's analysis suggested that cross burning was not "especially offensive" as it did not communicate ideas in a ''threatening (as
opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner." Id.
The Court then addressed the second exception which would permit
content-based discrimination: where
the regulation was aimed at the secondary effects of the speech without
reference to the content of the speech.
Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters
Inc.,475U.S.41,48 (1986». TheCity
ofSt. Paul cited this second exception
as the basis forthe discrimination in its
ordinance, arguing that the St. Paul
ordinance was not intended to stifle
freedom of expression, but rather was
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